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“REFRAMING” THE PRESENTATION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
Charlotte Ryan* 
Samuel Alexander**
Abstract: In 1995, Congress, with the support of the Clinton admini-
stration, passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act, a sweeping welfare reform designed to appease conser-
vative critics of 1960s War on Poverty programs. In the last decade, 
conservatives have intensiªed a comparable campaign to dismantle en-
vironmental programs and regulatory agencies established during the 
1970s through the efforts of the environmental movement. Conserva-
tives’ calls for market forces to replace governmental environmental 
protection programs echo the arguments of conservative opponents of 
welfare. Similarly, contemporary battles over environmental policy are 
being waged in the mass media arena. Therefore, it behooves environ-
mental advocates to review the public discourse that surrounded the 
welfare debates of the 1990s. Using frame analysis, this Essay describes 
the evolution of media discourse in Massachusetts from 1990 through 
1994 regarding the role of government and its responsibility in provid-
ing public welfare programs. The Essay then draws lessons from welfare 
reform that are relevant to current environmental debate. 
Introduction 
 In 1996, Congress, with support from the Clinton administration, 
passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion (Welfare Reform) Act,1 a sweeping welfare reform designed to 
appease conservative critics of the 1960s War on Poverty programs. In 
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1 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation (Welfare Reform) Act 
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the last decade, conservatives have intensiªed a comparable campaign 
to dismantle environmental programs and regulatory agencies estab-
lished during the 1970s through the efforts of the environmental 
movement.2
 Despite scientiªc evidence suggesting that environmental prob-
lems—such as global warming, water accessibility, and air quality—are 
worsening,3 conservatives are pressing for signiªcant changes in tort 
law, regulatory standards, and conservation efforts, all likely resulting 
in lesser governmental involvement in environmental protection. They 
argue that reducing governmental oversight will unleash market forces, 
thereby engendering more creative ways to protect the environment.4
 Conservatives’ calls for market forces to replace environmental 
protection programs strongly echo the arguments of conservative pol-
icy analysts that governmental welfare programs should be eliminated. 
Reiterating the three recurring themes of conservative rhetoric, welfare 
opponents in the 1990s argued that government programs should be 
eliminated, reduced, or recast, either because they perversely worsened 
the problems they were established to address, or because they wasted 
taxpayer money and amounted to little more than futile gestures.5 Ap-
pealing to proponents of cost-beneªt analysis, this argument further 
suggests that the continued existence of such programs is hazardous to 
the overall health of society and perhaps hazardous to the very indi-
viduals that the programs intend to help. In place of governmental in-
tervention, Secretary Norton has called for market-driven solutions that 
“‘favor human freedom [and] human creativity.’” 6
 There are a number of parallels between the legislative and regula-
tory struggle over welfare cuts in the 1990s and the current struggles 
over environmental and regulatory programs. In both cases, govern-
ment-based solutions were initially established after surges of social 
mobilization, in the 1960s and 1970s, respectively. In both cases, pro-
                                                                                                                      
2 See Bradford C. Mank, The Environmental Protection Agency’s Project XL and Other Regulatory 
Reform Initiatives: The Need for Legislative Authorization, 25 Ecology L.Q. 1, 36–37 (1998). 
3 Seth Borenstein, Scientists Issue Mixed Prognosis on Environment, Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette, Mar. 30, 2005, at A2. 
4 See Wendy Worrall Redal, Norton Seeks “Common Ground” on Conservation Issues, Cen-
ter for Envtl. Journalism Newsl., Winter 2005, http://colorado.edu/journalism/cej 
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the Interior Gale Norton has branded the currently existing approaches as “‘government 
coercion-based.’” Id. (quoting Gale Norton, Sec. of the Interior). 
5 For an analysis of recurring themes in conservative rhetoric, see Albert O. Hirsch-
man, The Rhetoric of Reaction 7 (1991). 
6 Redal, supra note 4 (quoting Gale Norton, Sec. of the Interior). 
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gram opponents have argued that market forces could address existing 
problems more effectively than governmental programs. Both debates 
concern the role of government in protecting the most vulnerable, be 
they children, the poor, or endangered species. In addition, cost-
beneªt analysis has been promoted as a reliable means of resolution for 
both of these debates, with opposing sides debating the deªnitions of 
terms: Are taxes a cost or an investment? How does society weigh short-
term costs against long-term impacts? How does society evaluate 
beneªts and losses? Finally, how does society balance who beneªts and 
who loses in any social planning equation? 
 Like the contemporary battles over environmental policy, the bat-
tle over welfare reform was waged in the mass media arena—the master 
forum of our historical epoch.7 Following the writings of Charles 
Murray, a policy analyst at the conservative Manhattan Institute, oppo-
nents of welfare programs posed individual accountability—personal 
responsibility—as the antidote to a bloated, incompetent welfare state 
that wasted taxpayers’ money by encouraging dependency on the gov-
ernment.8
 Over time, mainstream media began to shape its coverage to the 
contours of this account. As Washington Post writer Juan Williams ac-
knowledged at the time, “‘[n]ow we no longer ask how the federal gov-
ernment can help people who need it, but why should the government 
have to support these people at all.’”9 According to Williams, the view 
of “right-wing social scientist Charles Murray” had “‘insinuated itself 
into our coverage here and especially that of The New York Times and the 
networks. . . . Once you win that argument in an editor’s mind, you un-
dermine a lot of stories before they’re ever assigned or written.’”10
 Social welfare proponents were faced with a predicament in 
which media coverage played a critical role in the debates over policy 
at both the state and national levels, but failed to perform its alleged 
primary function of exposing incorrect information. This predica-
ment is similar to the one that confronts environmental advocates to-
day. One of the most salient aspects of the successful conservative ar-
gument in the debate over social welfare was the extent to which it 
was divorced from the realm of legitimate fact. As one analyst con-
                                                                                                                      
7 William A. Gamson, Social Movements and Cultural Change, in From Contention to 
Democracy 57, 76–77 (Marco G. Giugni et al. eds., 1998). 
8 See Mark Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency 
33 (1988). 
9 Id. (quoting Juan Williams, Reporter, Wash. Post). 
10 Id. (quoting Juan Williams, Reporter, Wash. Post). 
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cluded, “what was most striking about the coverage was its sheer su-
perªciality.”11 In a similar description of national debates, policy 
scholar and advocate Frances Fox Piven noted, “I am struck by how 
little evidence matters in talk about welfare.”12
 For all of the foregoing reasons, it behooves environmental advo-
cates to review the public discourse that surrounded the 1990s social 
welfare battles and to draw lessons from it for current environmental 
debates. Using the analytical tools of framing theory,13 this Essay de-
scribes the evolution of media discourse in Massachusetts from 1990 
to 1994 regarding the role of government and its responsibility in 
providing programs. This critical period led up to the federal Welfare 
Reform Act of 1996.14 The Essay begins by introducing some tools 
from framing theory and the underlying libertarian metaframe that 
infused conservative rhetoric on this issue. The Essay concludes by 
offering lessons relevant to environmental policy debates today. 
I. Frame Analysis 
 Recently, framing has gained popularity as a means to help policy 
analysts and advocates understand the way their issue is being shaped, 
or framed in the media.15 What does it mean to “frame an issue?” Some 
theorists and policy analysts think of a frame in classic rhetorical terms, 
treating any logical argument documented by fact and illustration as a 
frame.16 Others equate frames with policy stances, presenting each pol-
icy outcome as a different frame even if the policies have common 
ideological roots.17
                                                                                                                      
11 Michael Sullivan, Missing the Story: News Coverage of Welfare in the Hartford Cou-
rant and Boston Globe 16 (May 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on ªle with the University 
of Connecticut School of Social Work). 
12 Frances Fox Piven, Don’t Blame Welfare Mothers for Society’s Ills, St. Petersburg Times, 
May 8, 1994, at 8D. 
13 For previous discussions of frames and frame contests, see generally William A. Gam-
son, Talking Politics (1992); Charlotte Ryan, Prime Time Activism: Media Strategies 
for Grassroots Organizing (1991). This Essay builds upon the themes elaborated in both 
works. 
14 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation (Welfare Reform) Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codiªed as amended in scattered sections of 
7, 8, 21, 25, 42 U.S.C.). 
15 See Ryan, supra note 13, at 53. 
16 See Gamson, supra note 13, at 1–12. 
17 See Ryan, supra note 13, at 68. 
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A. Deªning “Frames” and “Framing” 
 We deªne a frame as a thought organizer. Like a window frame, it 
focuses the viewer’s attention on some part of the world, highlighting 
certain events and facts as important and rendering others invisible. 
However, a frame is not always cited explicitly. Like the skeletal frame 
of a building that holds things together but is covered by insulation 
and walls, a frame provides coherence to an array of symbols, images, 
and arguments. It makes one story relevant and another not. 
 We also distinguish between frames and framing. Framing is a 
ubiquitous process through which people read or interpret their ex-
periences in the world. All citizens are active framers. Building on our 
direct experience, our community’s values, and the opinions of our 
peers and our broader society—as learned via cultural institutions 
such as churches and media—we interpret our experiences, feelings, 
and cultural or religious assumptions to make sense of social conºicts. 
Framing is the process of mapping one’s social reality, whereas a 
frame is the product of that mapping—the underlying thought organ-
izer through which we relate events and stories. 
 Frames focus the reader, listener, or audience on what the frame 
sponsor thinks is the key element of an issue. Frames are not narrowly 
focused, but they do concentrate an argument and suggest the key 
elements of an issue, the key actors, and a range of acceptable solu-
tions. For example, to the conservative right, the key elements in an 
environmental regulatory struggle may be individual responsibility and 
the potential of free enterprise to replace the failings of bureaucratic 
government interventions. On the other hand, an environmental activ-
ist may approach the same regulatory struggle as an illustration of the 
need for collective political or social action to create stable environ-
ments, ensure sustainable communities, and protect the most vulner-
able. 
 Advocates must understand the distinction between frames as 
thought-organizers and framing as the universal interpretive process 
through which they are constructed. Without understanding this dis-
tinction, advocates might assume that they can craft and disseminate a 
winning frame—for example, a frame that moves people to see the 
world from the position of the advocate—and so mobilize people to 
support the reform that the advocate proposes. Frames only emerge 
after sustained dialogue with impacted constituencies. They are a 
product of the process of talking politics with strategically relevant 
constituencies. As such, they cannot simply be imposed by an enlight-
568 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 33:563 
ened, benevolent advocate—even one armed with an effective mar-
keting strategy. 
 While recognizing that framing as a process enhances efforts to 
mobilize allies, framing is a part of—not a replacement for—the pro-
cess of building social networks and strategic alliances. Despite the 
urgency of the crises facing environmental advocates, there is simply 
no way to avoid this need for network building in conjunction with 
message building. 
B. Frame Contests 
 Frame contests are struggles for power in the determination of 
what things mean. If power is control over rules, resources, and mean-
ings, framing contests are struggles to decide whose accounts will mat-
ter. In any framing contest, frame sponsors are trying to convince audi-
ences of their world view or perspective. Sponsors employ certain frame 
construction tools repetitively in these debates. These tools include: 
switchpoint cases, standard bearers, claims-making activities, torpedos, 
and issue-attention cycles. 
1. Switchpoint Cases 
 British policy analysts Peter Golding and Sue Middleton tracked 
the cycles of governmental programs in British history over four cen-
turies.18 In most cases, attacks on governmental programs were culti-
vated by media coverage of “switchpoint” cases—single cases that 
evoked the program opponents’ frame masterfully.19 These cases are 
easily sensationalized in the press and function as switchpoints by di-
verting public attention from structural analyses of the situation to-
ward secondary issues, such as the morality of the individuals in-
volved.20
 Readers and viewers of switchpoint cases tend to assume that the 
cases are common and representative. Conservative campaigns attack-
ing governmental regulatory or subsistence programs routinely high-
light switchpoint cases that feature welfare cheaters, drug abusers, ne-
glectful parents, and various other malefactors.21 Switchpoint cases in 
the 1990s welfare reform debates were selected to lend credibility to 
                                                                                                                      
18 See generally Peter Golding & Sue Middleton, Images of Welfare: Press and 
Public Attitudes to Poverty (1982). 
19 See id. at 60–67 (discussing the media’s reaction to an English case in the 1970s). 
20 See id. at 62, 79–80. 
21 See id. at 64–66. 
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the line, “What she needs is a job!” Today, opponents of environmental 
regulation would seek switchpoint cases that epitomize boondoggles— 
situations in which massive governmental spending devolved into spe-
cial interest proªteering and taxpayer loss, while producing scant envi-
ronmental gain. 
2. Standard Bearers 
 Standard bearers are key spokespersons in positions of authority, 
such as elected ofªcials or academic experts, who use their position to 
advocate their frames.22 Reporters will not trust frames that lack such 
sponsorship. Progressives have particular problems with journalists’ ap-
proaches to standard bearers, since reporters do not typically recognize 
that someone can become an “expert” through life experiences or a 
well-reasoned political stance. 
3. Claims-Making Activities 
 As part of frame building, key facts are marshaled to make an ar-
gument. Often these are repeated until they are assumed to be correct, 
even if they are not. Examples of such facts include oft-repeated claims 
of rising teenage pregnancy, illegitimate births, and welfare fraud rates. 
When a recognized standard bearer makes claims that reinforce a pre-
existing storyline and way of thinking—for example, “government is 
inefªcient” or “welfare keep teens pregnant”—and attaches those 
claims to switchpoint stories, reporters are likely to repeat the stories.23 
When that effect is multiplied by a national conservative public rela-
tions apparatus—comprised of experts, researchers, think tanks, publi-
cists, and politicians—making timely news hooks by proposing legisla-
tion, a major ideological war ensues. 
4. Torpedoes 
 Some cultural beliefs have such credibility that the person who 
evokes them—particularly if that individual is a standard bearer—is 
rarely questioned. “There’s no money,” for instance, is a simple, be-
lievable message to audiences who frequently ªnd their own bank ac-
counts dwindling. We will return to this concept in the coming discus-
                                                                                                                      
22 See id. at 78. 
23 See Golding & Middleton, supra note 18, at 78–80. 
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sion of the evolution of the Weld administration’s framing of the so-
cial welfare issue.24
5. Issue-Attention Cycles 
 One additional news routine that affected coverage is the notion 
of an issue-attention cycle, which has been elaborated by the public pol-
icy scholar, Anthony Downs.25 Positing a ªve-stage cycle—pre-problem; 
heightened media attention; recognition of complexity attending genu-
ine resolution; declining media attention; and dormancy—Downs high-
lights the very ªckle nature of media attention.26 Issue-attention cycle 
was decisive in the coverage of the policy debates in the early 1990s; 
after four months of heightened coverage of funding of programs, cov-
erage of welfare debates dwindled.27 Media scholar Herbert Gans calls 
this the “repetition taboo”: an issue deemed overexposed will be 
avoided for one to two years.28
II. Case Study: The Massachusetts Welfare Framing Battle 
 Massachusetts legislative debates over welfare policy between 
1991 and 1994 foreshadowed national debates that produced the Wel-
fare Reform Act of 1996.29 A historically liberal state with an ascen-
dant, self-proclaimed liberal Republican governor—William Weld— 
Massachusetts had been resistant to cuts in programs that had passed 
in other states. The Weld administration’s approach reºected this 
reticence. When Weld cut several programs in 1991, his tone was one 
of regret as he announced that the state did not have adequate funds, 
even for the deserving poor.30 In embarking on this cautious course, 
Weld demonstrated a reluctance to engage in what would become a 
hallmark of struggles to gut social welfare programs: challenging the 
validity of poor people’s demands. While drug addicts and alcoholics 
                                                                                                                      
24 See infra Part III.A. 
25 Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology—The “Issue-Attention Cycle,” in Political 
Theory and Public Choice 100, 100–12 (1998). 
26 See id. at 110–12. 
27 See generally Charlotte Ryan, The Media War over Welfare, 8 Peace Rev. 13 (1996). 
28 Herbert J. Gans, Deciding What’s News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC 
Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time 169 (1979). 
29 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation (Welfare Reform) 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codiªed as amended in scattered sections 
of 7, 8, 21, 25, 42 U.S.C.). 
30 See Frank Phillips, Weld Details $800M Cuts Package; Seeks Reductions in General Relief, 
State Salaries, Rent Aid, Boston Globe, May 3, 1991, at 1. 
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being carried on welfare were demonized to some extent, the Weld 
administration primarily defended cuts as ªscal necessities—the state 
simply had no money.31
 By 1994, with his national ambitions swelling in an increasingly 
conservative climate, Weld changed course and began branding wel-
fare mothers as “undeserving poor.”32 In one notorious switchpoint 
case, Weld arranged a media blitz around a single instance of welfare 
abuse.33 He then pushed reforms through a previously resistant De-
mocratic-dominated state legislature.34
 The case involved a twenty-six-year-old single mother, Claribel 
Rivera Ventura, who was accused of scalding her four-year-old child 
and leaving his wounds untreated for weeks.35 Ventura represented 
every stereotype of a faulty welfare system. First, as a mother of six 
pregnant with her seventh child, she was framed as a baby factory.36 
Second, she represented the stereotype of multigenerational depend-
ency—the notion that welfare begets welfare. Claribel’s mother had 
raised seventeen children on welfare, fourteen of whom were now col-
lectively raising seventy-four children on welfare.37 Third, she embod-
ied the stereotype of welfare mothers as negligent drug addicts, since 
she had a history of drug addiction and her children had been re-
moved by the state several times.38 Ventura’s case symbolized the 
stereotypical “welfare queen” who drains public coffers to live in idle 
extravagance.39
 Governor Weld acknowledged that Ventura and her family were 
not representative of Massachusetts welfare recipients.40 Nevertheless, 
Weld sent all state lawmakers copies of the media coverage of the Ven-
tura case and passed the story along to leading national conservatives, 
                                                                                                                      
31 See id.; see also infra Part III.A. 
32 See infra Part III.A. 
33 Don Aucoin & Scot Lehigh, Weld Using Story on Welfare Family to Aid His Case on Need 
for Reform, Boston Globe, Feb. 25, 1994, at 14. 
34 See Charles M. Sennott, Whatever Happened to Claribel? Looking for the Poster Child of the 
Welfare Reform Movement in Massachusetts, 10 Years Later, Boston Globe, Apr. 11, 2004, at D1. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Charles M. Sennott, Surrender of Mother Wanted in Scalding of Child Is Delayed, Boston 
Globe, Aug. 20, 1994, at 23. 
38 Charles M. Sennott & David Armstrong, Kin Feel Abuse Suspect Has Fled; Say Ventura 
Called from Puerto Rico, Boston Globe, Apr. 12, 1994, at 25. 
39 State ofªcials estimated that the extended Ventura family alone cost taxpayers close 
to one million dollars each year. Sennott, supra note 37, at 23. 
40 Aucoin & Lehigh, supra note 33, at 14. 
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such as Jack Kemp and William Bennett.41 Within Massachusetts, Weld 
and conservative Democrats used the case to demand conservative wel-
fare policies, including the privatization of social services, cuts in 
beneªts, and changes in how the state would relate to national welfare 
programs.42 A punitive legislature, which had become toughened 
against the plight of welfare families, passed legislation that had been 
unthinkable only a few years earlier.43
 Weld used his standing as a public ofªcial to establish himself as a 
standard bearer. He received ample media space for his views, while 
welfare mothers were treated as no more than the human-interest 
ºesh on his analysis, and all opposed were labeled as special interests, 
rather than analytical experts. In sheer numbers, governmental 
ofªcials in Massachusetts promoting cuts in welfare services were quoted 
seventeen times more often than welfare recipients and thirty-four 
times more often than social welfare workers—two constituencies with 
direct experience of the problem at hand.44 Public interest advocates 
fared slightly better, but were still out-quoted by a ratio of six to one.45
 By the time of the second Weld administration in 1994, a national 
media campaign against programs was in full swing in preparation for 
the latest welfare reform bill.46 The Weld administration’s comments 
now focused far more commonly on constituencies than on govern-
ment or societal problems. Following the cues given in the Claribel 
Ventura debacle, public debate would question the worthiness of wel-
fare mothers rather than search for the most appropriate response to 
poverty. This constituency-centered attack made social welfare activ-
ists’ task far more difªcult. Human service advocates were frequently 
consumed by the task of defending constituencies as “deserving poor.”47
 Even when advocates and activists focused remarks on problems 
like poverty rather than on vulnerable constituencies like the poor, 
news norms made it difªcult to introduce frames that highlighted the 
structural sources of problems and possible structural resolutions. In 
short, the Weld administration, backed by a national claims-making ef-
fort, effectively extended the characterization of the Ventura switch-
                                                                                                                      
41 Id. 
42 See Sennott, supra note 34, at D1. 
43 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 118, § 2 (2004); see Sennott, supra note 34, at D1. 
44 See Sullivan, supra note 11, at app. D. 
45 See id. 
46 See Sennott, supra note 34, at D1. 
47 Charlotte Ryan & Bill Hoynes, Media Research and Action Project, Finding 
Home in the Media: How Print Media Covered Cuts in Massachusetts Human Ser-
vices, January 1991–October 1991, at 9 (1992). 
2006] "Reframing" Environmental Law and Policy 573 
point case to demonize an entire constituency that lacked a wide base 
of support.48 In part, his administration was able to accomplish this by 
inserting anger-provoking caricatures into the public consciousness and 
cutting programs during the resulting furor.49 The conservatives’ suc-
cess in Massachusetts was repeated in other states and softened opposi-
tion to welfare reform nationally, even though public opinion research 
showed that sixty-four percent of the American public thought gov-
ernment spent too little on poor children.50
 In summary, the use of switchpoints, standard bearers, and consis-
tently repeated claims had a cumulative effect. Additionally, there were 
critical resource disparities between the sponsors of conservative frames 
and the sponsors of frames supporting social welfare and the public 
sector.51 Sponsors of the conservative frames were building on a trend 
promoted by a national conservative movement which, through key 
powerful ªgures, crucial think tanks, and their journals, brokered ac-
cess into national trend-setting media, such as Time, Newsweek, the New 
York Times, the Washington Post, Reader’s Digest, and Nightline.52 In con-
trast, social welfare supporters had no national or local movement of 
comparable strength, had fewer advocates in positions of power, and 
had far less access to trend-setting media.53
 However, this discussion of short-term framing tactics—switch- 
points, standard-bearers, and claims-making techniques—cannot fully 
explain how a frame develops into a viable representation of reality. 
The conservative movement targeted cuts in governmental programs 
and their replacement by market initiatives shortly after the War on 
Poverty began in the 1960s.54 While some date the campaign to elimi-
nate welfare as having begun with the Goldwater campaign in 1964, the 
                                                                                                                      
48 See Sennott, supra note 34, at D1. 
49 Id. 
50 Geoffrey Garin et al., Public Attitudes Toward Welfare Reform, Soc. Pol’y, Winter 1994, 
at 44, 46. 
51 Randy Albelda & Chris Tilly, Glass Ceilings and Bottomless Pits: Women’s 
Work, Women’s Poverty 97–100 (1997); Michael Massing, The Welfare Blues: Life for Me 
Aint’ Been No Crystal Stair, N.Y. Rev., Mar. 24, 1994, 41, 45–48; Christopher Georges, Conser-
vative Heritage Foundation Finds Recipe for Inºuence: Ideas + Marketing = Clout, Wall Street 
J., Aug. 10, 1995, at A10. 
52 See William Greider, Who Will Tell the People? The Betrayal of American 
Democracy 300 (1992). 
53 Philip E. Kovacs & Deron R. Boyles, Institutes, Foundations, & Think Tanks: Conserva-
tive Inºuence on U.S. Public Schools, Pub. Resistance, May 1, 2005, at 24, 26, available at 
http://www.publicresistance.org/journals/1.1-3Institutes.pdf. 
54 Jonathan Zasloff, Children, Families, and Bureaucrats: A Prehistory of Welfare Reform, 14 
J.L. & Pol. 225, 272 (1998). 
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1984 publication of Losing Ground, which was conservative policy analyst 
Charles Murray’s call to dismantle welfare, marked a new initiative.55 By 
1988, Ronald Reagan could devote a portion of his State of the Union 
address to challenging the federal welfare program: “My friends, some 
years ago, the Federal Government declared war on poverty, and pov-
erty won.”56
 The conservatives’ approach was comprehensive. When inde-
pendent evaluations of War on Poverty programs failed to prove the 
programs’ futility, conservatives developed a series of “think tanks” 
designed to manufacture and disseminate research promoting the use 
of market initiatives to replace government programs. Political analyst 
David Callahan explains: 
[T]he big development of the 1990s is that conservative in-
stitutes have had spectacular new success in tapping business 
money to fund ideologically charged policy research. 
 Over the past 10 years, a huge inºux of private sector 
money has allowed conservative think tanks and advocacy 
groups to grow by leaps and bounds. Not only are well-
known organizations like CATO, the American Enterprise 
Institute and the Heritage Foundation more ºush with cash 
than ever, but giving by corporations and wealthy business-
men—all of which is tax-deductible—has underwritten the 
rise of a new generation of smaller and often brasher con-
servative think tanks like the Competitive Enterprise Insti-
tute (CEI) and the Reason Foundation. Corporate money 
has also fueled the explosive growth of dozens of state-based 
conservative think tanks, of which the Independent Institute 
is a prime example. In 1996 . . . the top 20 conservative think 
tanks spent $158 million, more than half of it contributed by 
corporations or wealthy businessmen.57
 The top twenty conservative think tanks—including the Manhat-
tan Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Insti-
tute, and the Cato Institute—were the brainchildren of “conservative 
groups that were often backed by big business, conservative founda-
                                                                                                                      
55 See generally Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950–
1980 (1994). 
56 Pres. Ronald Reagan, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the 
Union, 134 Cong. Rec. 52, 54 ( Jan. 25, 1988), available at http://www.presidentreagan.info 
/speeches/reagan_sotu_1988.cfm. 
57 David Callahan, The Think Tank as Flack, Wash. Monthly, Nov. 1999, at 21, 21–22. 
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tions, and similar interests.”58 These institutions funded research aimed 
at establishing legitimate grounds for conservative stances. While the 
issues were numerous, many of them reinforced conservatives’ desire to 
downsize government and remove it from the sphere of social problem 
solving.59
 However, top-down conspiracy theories do not do justice to con-
servatives’ strategic operations. Conservative gains accrued from a 
highly effective melding of conservative thinkers and corporate-
subsidized think tanks capable of strategically promoting an agenda 
that utilized social science research, lobbying operations, public rela-
tions dissemination systems,60 and direct organizing in venues such as 
evangelical churches, local elections, and universities.61 National think 
tanks were supplemented by the establishment of institutional infra-
structure on the state and local level. For example, of the more than 
$254 million worth of public policy grants made by conservative foun-
dations between 1999 and 2001, the National Committee for Respon-
sive Philanthropy (NCRP) estimated that: 
[F]ully 46 percent of funding ($115.9 million) went directly 
to national and state public policy think tanks. This is telling. 
The fact that conservatives concentrate on policymaking at 
both the national and state levels signals a departure from 
most left-leaning and centrist foundations, which generally 
only focus on national issues. All told, conservatives poured 
$21.4 million into state-centered institutions during the 
study period, and The State Policy Network, funded by the 
Roe Foundation, exists to encourage cooperation among 
free-market think tanks in the network. . . . [T]his program 
has seen some serious growth over the last 15 years: “In 1989 
there were only 12 market-oriented state-based think tanks. 
This number has more than tripled in the past decade, and 
                                                                                                                      
58 Robert Sahr, Credentialing Experts: The Climate of Opinion and Journalist Selection of 
Sources in Domestic and Foreign Policy, in Media and Public Policy 153, 161 (Robert J. Spit-
zer ed., 1993). 
59 Jerome L. Himmelstein, To the Right: The Transformation of American Con-
servatism 28–62 (1990). 
60 Modern public relations systems include computerized media databases, clipping 
services, and staff dedicated to executing long-term strategic communication plans. See 
generally Philip Kotler & Gary Armstrong, Principles of Marketing (2001). 
61 Himmelstein, supra note 59, at 28–62. 
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there are now 40 groups in 37 states promoting free market 
solutions to policy problems and challenges.”62
Additionally, conservatives took seriously the issue of leadership de-
velopment and began creating internships, training, and networking 
opportunities for young conservatives.63
 The issue of research dissemination deserves particular attention. 
Reºecting the principles of social marketing, many conservative and 
progressive think tanks package their research for busy journalists: 
“Although marketing social change is much more difªcult than mar-
keting commercial products, the basic premise is the same: Develop a 
solid, strategic approach by positioning and packaging the product 
. . . and framing messages about it to address the needs, wants, and 
values of target audience members.”64 As is standard practice in pub-
lic relations,65 think tank public relations departments distribute eas-
ily digested executive summaries of research reports to a wide range 
of media outlets using well-maintained media databases, and then 
make follow-up calls to journalists in major media markets. In some 
cases, think tanks hold conferences inviting carefully selected scholars 
to discuss the ªndings of the think tank’s own scholars. The market-
ing of Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray’s The Bell Curve 66 pro-
vides a case in point. As the editors of the scholarly journal Contempo-
rary Sociology explain: 
First, Charles Murray, with the support of the American En-
terprise Institute (AEI), handpicked a set of people who were 
given a chance to read the book before its release. And not 
only to read it, but then to come to Washington (expenses 
paid by the AEI) for a two-day seminar (October 1–2), where 
they could hear the reactions of other scholars, work through 
the evaluations of the book by a group intended to be suppor-
                                                                                                                      
62 Eric Alterman & Paul McLeary, Think Again: “Ideas Have Consequences: So Does 
Money,” Center for Am. Progress, Oct. 14, 2004, http://www.americanprogress.org/site/ 
pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=222111.
63 See, e.g., Young America’s Foundation’s Student Programs, http://www.student. 
yaf.org (last visited Mar. 13, 2006). For historical examples, see Rebecca E. Klatch, A 
Generation Divided: The New Left, the New Right, and the 1960s, at 265–66 (1999); 
Gregory L. Schneider, Cadres for Conservatism: Young Americans for Freedom 
and the Rise of the Contemporary Right 27–32 (1999).
64 Michael Siegel & Lynne Doner, Marketing Public Health 197 (1998). 
65 For standard public relations practices, see Dennis L. Wilcox & Glen T. Cameron, 
Public Relations: Strategies and Tactics (8th ed. 2006). 
66 See generally Richard J. Herrnstein & Charles Murray, The Bell Curve: Intel-
ligence and Class Structure in American Life (1994). 
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tive, and do so in interaction with selected media stars—a 
tremendous head start. 
 . . . . 
 Second, the rest of the world had trouble even getting hold 
of the book. Nor was this accidental. The Wall Street Journal 
(October 20, 1994, p. B1) reports that the book was “swept 
forward by a strategy that provided book galleys to likely sup-
porters while withholding them from likely critics.” . . . Evi-
dently we here at Contemporary Sociology were counted as likely 
critics—certainly we had a great deal of trouble getting hold 
of the book. We submitted a normal order months before the 
book appeared, but our copy never came. Even after the book 
appeared we had to make repeated phone calls, were prom-
ised three copies but received only one, were promised deliv-
ery in two days but waited two weeks, etc. 
 The result was that, in the crucial weeks immediately after 
the book’s release, supporters knew the book far better than 
critics.67
While some think tanks spend roughly one-third of their budgets on 
such activities, others hire public relations ªrms to disseminate self-
published, nonpeer-reviewed research.68
 Washington now supports a number of public relation ªrms 
which provide corporate or think tank-initiated campaigns with inte-
grated marketing that cover everything from research development to 
favorable polling, lobbying, and grassroots canvassing. Calling this 
“democracy for hire,” William Greider concludes, “[a] major industry 
has grown up in Washington . . . devoted to concocting facts and 
opinions and expert analysis, then aiming them at the government.”69 
The democratic discourse is now dominated by such transactions.70 
During the years leading up to welfare reform Sally Covington, Direc-
tor of the Democracy and Philanthropy Project of the National Com-
mittee for Responsive Philanthropy, estimated that the top twelve con-
servative foundations with $1.1 billion in assets at their disposal 
awarded $300 million in grants and targeted another $210 million for 
                                                                                                                      
67 From the Editor’s Desk, 24:2 Contemp. Soc., at ix (1995). 
68 John C. Stauber & Sheldon Rampton, Toxic Sludge Is Good for You: Lies, 
Damn Lies and the Public Relations Industry 189–93 (1995). 
69 Greider, supra note 52, at 35. 
70 Id. 
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institutions and special projects.71 The grants targeted “government 
rollback through the privatization of government services, deregula-
tion of industry and the environment, devolution of authority from 
the federal to state and local governments, and deep cuts in federal 
anti-poverty spending.”72
 By 1995, conservative institutions were mentioned in media almost 
eight times more often than liberal or progressive think tanks—8000 
and 1152 citations, respectively.73 Covington added that the combined 
1995 budgets for the top eight liberal or progressive groups were less 
than a quarter of the budgets for the top ªve conservative think 
tanks.74 She concludes, “While revenue base may be only one factor 
underlying (or contributing to) organizational capacity and effective-
ness, surely it is a critical one.”75
 Describing the efforts of those twelve foundations as “impressively 
coherent,”76 Covington lists a series of initiatives aimed at challenging 
what conservatives “regard as the institutional strongholds of modern 
American liberalism: academia, Congress, the judiciary, executive branch 
agencies, major media, religious institutions, and philanthropy itself.”77 
She particularly notes policy initiatives, support for conservative schol-
ars and academic programs, and funds “targeted to recruit and train 
the next generation of right-wing leaders in conservative legal princi-
ples.”78 Finally, she highlights efforts to establish “a conservative media 
apparatus, support pro-market legal organizations, fund state-level 
think tanks and advocacy organizations, and mobilize new philan-
thropic resources for conservative policy change.”79
                                                                                                                      
71 Sally Covington, How Conservative Philanthropies and Think Tanks Transform US Policy, 
CovertAction Q., Spring 1998, at 6, 7, available at http://mediaªlter.org/CAQ/caq63/ 
CAQ63thinktank.html. 
72 Id. at 7. 
73 Id. at 11. 
74 Id. at 14. 
75 Id.; see also Jean Hardisty, Mobilizing Resentment: Conservative Resurgence 
from the John Birch Society to the Promise Keepers 15–16 (1999) (explaining that 
liberal and progressive resources went towards social services rather than movement-
building”). 
76 Covington, supra note 71, at 7. 
77 Id. at 7; see also Philip H. Burch, Introduction to Reagan, Bush, and Right-Wing Politics: 
Elites, Think Thanks [sic], Power, and Policy, 16 Res. in Pol. Econ. 91, 91–128 (1997). 
78 Covington, supra note 71, at 7. 
79 Id. at 7. For more extensive treatment of this topic, see generally Trudy Lieberman, 
Slanting the Story: The Forces That Shape the News (2000); Stauber & Rampton, 
supra note 68. For an emphasis on the incorporation of modern marketing and public 
relations tactics, see Himmelstein, supra note 59, at 144–51. 
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 When Governor Weld took on social welfare policy in the 1990s, 
he was availing himself of conservative groups’ ªfteen years of fram-
ing work. As a result, Massachusetts conservatives promoting the cuts 
were able to ªt the issue into a cohesive frame stressing personal re-
sponsibility. We outline that frame below, building on our analysis of 
Massachusetts welfare cuts in 1990 and 1994 to 1995. We then discuss 
the “personal responsibility frame” in relationship to a broader, liber-
tarian metaframe that is currently being mobilized by opponents of 
environmental programs and regulation. 
III. The Personal Responsibility Frame 
 Conservative groups working to cut Massachusetts social welfare 
programs sponsored a consistent, multilayered message—or frame— 
which prompted the following answers to these recurrent questions: 
• What’s wrong with American society? 
The decline of family, the lack of individual accountability, 
the rise of the welfare state, big regulatory bureaucracies, big 
unions, and big spending; and 
• What should be done about it? 
Individual responsibility, no free lunch, privatization, deregu-
lation, tax cuts, free the market, put a bootstrap in every pot. 
 At the core of this frame is a standard conservative call to replace 
government with free market mechanisms coupled with calls for per-
sonal or individual responsibility—the personal responsibility frame. As 
with environmental protection, the conservative frame builds on an 
individualistic, libertarian notion of freedom that asserts progress de-
pends on unleashing the market and freeing the individual taxpayer. 
The conservative frame also fuels resentment of the unemployed by the 
working poor and feeds mistrust of the public sector. Republican politi-
cal consultant Todd Domke comments that “‘[m]iddle-class taxpayers 
are suspicious of professional lobbyists for the poor.’”80
                                                                                                                      
80 Peter J. Howe, Warnings of Doom Backªre With Some; Advocates for Needy Meet Skepticism 
Though Worst State Cuts Are to Come, Boston Globe, Apr. 30, 1991, at 1 (quoting Todd 
Domke, Republican political consultant). 
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A. Torpedoes 
 The personal responsibility frame is often not fully presented. 
Rather, it is subtly suggested by a number of “torpedoes”—subthemes 
that serve to insert an issue into the personal responsibility frame: 
1. Undeserving poor 
• “Don’t you know a person on welfare who rips people off”; 
• “Government is full of corrupt, special interests”; 
• “There’s no money”; 
• “Free the taxpayer” and “No new taxes.” 
2. Volunteerism 
• “Thousand points of light”; 
• “Welfare begets welfare”; 
• “Down with big government.” 
3. Efªciency 
• “Americans deserve a leaner, tighter safety net.” 
4. Bootstrappers: 
• “People who don’t appreciate things that are done for them just 
need self-help.” 
5. Entrepreneurial government 
• “Government by the free market.” 
B. Conservative Characterizations 
 As part of the frame contest, the conservative analysis characterizes 
each relevant social actor as “good guys” or “bad guys.” Thus, the per-
sonal responsibility frame can “frame” each public sector and social 
welfare-related constituency. It also “frames” each conservative ally: 
 Conservative Constituencies 
Constituency: Characterization: 
Public employee unions Special interests 
Service providers Special interests 
Service recipients Undeserving bootstrappers—cut welfare 
Taxpayers Hardworking, noble victims 
Corporations Free market will raise all boats 
Government Bloated fat cats; bureaucrats fostering 
dependency to stay in business 
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 Even Governor Weld’s early strategy of nondemonizing complaints 
about budget shortfalls frequently appealed to these divisive characteri-
zations. Television advertisements carried the “There’s no money” mes-
sage by showing an average family balancing its checkbook at the 
kitchen table. The implicit and sometimes explicit message was, “On 
your paycheck, can you afford to support people who don’t want to 
work?” 
 An intense upsurge of resentment between the working poor and 
poor appeared in a sample of articles discussing cuts in the clothing al-
lowance. Following a largely sympathetic Patriot Ledger article on clothing 
allowance cuts,81 twenty-three of twenty-four letters to the editor attacked 
a welfare-mother quoted in the article. The writers, self-described work-
ing men and women, argued that welfare recipients expected the gov-
ernment to provide a level of support that they—working poor and mid-
dle class individuals—lacked.82 In the twenty-fourth letter, the quoted 
welfare mother attempted to explain her position.83
                                                                                                                      
81 Michael Paulson, Welfare Moms: Cuts Turn Kids’ Clothes to Rags, Patriot Ledger 
(Quincy, Mass.), Aug. 12, 1991, at 1. 
82 The following letters to the editor all appeared in the Quincy, Massachusetts Patriot 
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83 Peggy Munchbach, Letter to the Editor, Patriot Ledger (Quincy, Mass.), Aug. 27, 
1991, at 14. 
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IV. Lessons for Environmental Advocates 
 Advocates entangled in current policy debates over environ-
mental protection can draw rich lessons from the social policy battles 
of the 1990s. These lessons pertain to what conservatives opposing 
welfare did effectively, as well as to what social welfare supporters 
failed to do. As noted above, starting in the 1960s, conservatives 
poured resources into a multipronged effort at rolling back New Deal 
and War on Poverty programs.84 They funded conservative think 
tanks and electoral campaigns for over a decade before achieving ma-
jor advances. Conservative funding also helped to establish an impres-
sive national and international communications infrastructure.85 In 
addition to internships offered by think tanks and electoral cam-
paigns, conservatives bankrolled training programs for college-aged 
leaders.86
 In short, conservatives knew that they had embarked on a long-
term war to position themselves, rather than a series of shortterm 
maneuvering battles. At least temporarily, internal divisions between 
different wings of the conservative movement—libertarians and evan-
gelical Christians in particular—were held at bay as conservatives 
united around a message that government welfare programs had per-
versely weakened the families the programs sought to help. Social wel-
fare policy was a strategically selected issue on which conservatives 
could now win thanks to the social and organizational resources ac-
cumulated since the 1960s. 
 By contrast, social welfare defenders—public sector advocates and 
human service supporters—were underresourced and disorganized. 
They tended to launch defensive battles on single issues, rarely con-
tributing to a longterm vision. Each stopgap battle left the social wel-
fare defenders feeling enervated. Their crisis-response mode to single-
issue battles provided difªculties in building a stronger infrastructure, 
developing longterm alliances, and creating a deeper base. Divisions 
among social welfare advocates were also deepened by defense strate-
gies that left each constituency to defend itself independently, while the 
other constituencies avoided tainting by the conservative “scalpel at-
tacks.” Some coalition members were far better resourced and net-
worked than others, with welfare activists and the homeless often being 
the most marginalized. Faced with the demonization of a coalition ally, 
                                                                                                                      
84 See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
85 See Greider, supra note 52, at 300. 
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advocates focused on saving their own less demonized program— deci-
sions that created serious tensions. 
 While recognizing that these issues merit fuller treatment,87 we 
turn to framing lessons for environmentalists. In the social welfare 
policy battles, conservatives found an issue that could advance an un-
derlying libertarian metaframe88 that stressed three points: 
• Freedom of the individual from governmental constraints. Fol-
lowing Isaiah Berlin,89 Hirschman describes this as “negative lib-
erty”—“the individual’s ‘freedom from’ certain interferences on 
the part of other individuals or authorities”—in contrast to “posi-
tive liberty”—“the ‘freedom to’ exercise traditional republican 
virtue by means of participation in public affairs and in the po-
litical life of the community.”90 
• Free market competition. This was seen as the source of human 
progress and creativity. 
• The need to restrict government’s role. This would, in turn, free 
individuals and the market. 
 The issue of welfare was ideal for reinforcing the libertarian meta-
frame’s central themes. Standard bearers, such as Governor Weld— 
valuable precisely because he claimed to be a liberal Republican from 
the liberal bastion of Massachusetts—drove home the libertarian meta-
frame in the switchpoint case of Claribel Ventura. As mentioned above, 
that case perfectly facilitated the caricature of welfare programs as en-
couraging multigenerational dependency and as ineffective govern-
ment programs run by out-of-touch bureaucrats.91
                                                                                                                      
87 We do not fully address lessons regarding resource accumulation, base-building, 
coalition strategies, the shifting roles of political parties, and the infrastructural work en-
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88 Evangelical Christian frames united with libertarians in opposing social welfare pro-
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example, faith-based supporters of social welfare programs have strongly lobbied their 
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social welfare programs. 
Environmental advocates may expect similar splits as conservatives debate the mean-
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89 See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty 118, 122–34 
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90 Hirschman, supra note 5, at 87. 
91 See supra notes 35–43 and accompanying text. 
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 In general, social welfare activists and advocates did not promote 
an opposing frame. There was no unifying vision for the relative roles 
and responsibilities of the family, labor, corporations, and the public 
sector to oppose that of the personal responsibility frame. Instead, ac-
tivists responded in a piecemeal fashion, reacting defensively to each 
conservative attack and often staying within the logic set by the conser-
vative frame. In other words, conservatives framed human service re-
cipients as “undeserving poor,” 92 people who are burdens to hardwork-
ing taxpayers, stultiªed by their dependency on government programs. 
Typically, human service defenders responded by attempting to prove 
that there were “deserving poor,” rather than to reframe the issue. 
 Generally, the problem with arguing within a frame is that it re-
stricts the ªeld of debate, thereby forcing opponents to operate 
within the deªnition of the issue set by the frame sponsors. In this 
case, the “deserving poor” response left in place the issues of the 
efªcacy of welfare programs, including the issue of continued de-
pendency on government programs interested in self-perpetuation. 
The “deserving poor” argument also failed to acknowledge that the 
economic gains since the mid-1970s had largely beneªted the upper 
twenty percent of American households and bypassed the working 
class and working poor.93 This created the material basis for the poli-
tics of resentment that conservatives so carefully fanned. In sum, wel-
fare advocates were calling on the desperate to be charitable to the 
more desperate, while not acknowledging how cuts in public educa-
tion and other federal programs had already shifted a major tax bur-
den to the states. 
 Underlying social welfare advocates’ defensive posture was a lack 
of unity on an ideological level. They shared no metaframe and were 
divided regarding what to say about the very real problems of the exist-
ing welfare state. They differed on whether to highlight the widening 
gaps between rich, poor, and working poor. Furthermore, they were 
not able to respond to libertarian characterizations of big labor—such 
as self-serving, undemocratic budget breakers—or big government and 
the public sector as being bureaucratic, inefªcient, special-interest ori-
ented, and corrupt. While some polls suggested that taxpayers were 
willing to pay for services but did not trust the public sector to spend 
                                                                                                                      
92 See supra Part III.A. 
93 Isaac Shapiro et al., Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Pathbreaking CBO 
Study Shows Dramatic Increases in Income Disparity in 1980s and 1990s, at 1–2 
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their money wisely,94 social welfare advocates did not respond ade-
quately to this concern. No one framed taxes as community investment 
or spoke of education as investment in the nation’s future. The positive 
meaning of liberty as freedom to engage in community building was 
lost. Silencing such a response before it could even be articulated was 
the classic conservative torpedo: “There’s no money.” 
 In sum, the libertarian metaframe convinced the public that de-
mocracy was freedom from responsibility towards community. Retreat-
ing to the defense of individual programs, social welfare proponents 
often did not present a well-woven frame that countered the libertar-
ian metaframe. Single-issue campaigns and single-program defenses 
did not hold together as a complete vision. 
 There are several possible reasons for the failure of welfare pro-
ponents. First and foremost, there were issues of underdevelopment. 
Alternative framings needed more repetition, elaboration, and illus-
tration in order to seem as “real” to the reporter as market-driven 
economic frames. Alternative frames regarding economic develop-
ment or a progressive role for government were skeletal. Social wel-
fare supporters also lacked the resources, networks, and infrastruc-
ture to develop and sustain a frame contest.95
 Social welfare supporters also lacked strong standard bearers. 
Advocates had weak legislative support, which also weakened their 
credibility as standard bearers. Moreover, reporters looked to the state 
legislature as the arena deªning the legitimate range of views to be 
debated. While social welfare programs had some legislative backing, 
these elected sponsors were not outspoken; they felt outgunned by 
legislators supporting cuts who were seen by mainstream media as the 
more legitimate sources. As Juan Williams explained, media profes-
sionals had adopted the libertarian metaframe that presented taxes as 
restrictions on both market growth and individual wealth.96 Reporters 
no longer accepted as valid the framing of taxes as investments in a 
community’s present, and a nation’s future, well-being. Within their 
dominant frame, the citizen-taxpayer’s self-interest rested not in 
community sustainability, but in cutting taxes. 
                                                                                                                      
94 Garin et al., supra note 50, at 46. 
95 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
96 See Hertsgaard, supra note 8, at 33 (quoting Juan Williams, Reporter, Wash. Post) 
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V. Framing Environmental Policy 
 Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton has been unusually explicit 
in avowing her adherence to the libertarian metaframe. In a Novem-
ber 23, 2004 speech at the University of Colorado at Boulder, Norton 
described herself as ªrmly committed to market approaches to solving 
environmental problems.97 Norton explained that her positions as 
Secretary of the Interior were informed by “‘a fairly libertarian per-
spective.’”98 She continued: 
“That’s a part of why I try to ªnd approaches that are not 
government coercion-based. I favor approaches that favor 
human freedom, human creativity.” 
 “Market forces . . . establish . . . a way for people to be 
creative as they’re making decisions about environmental 
protections. So it’s not just top-down regulation after regula-
tion from the Environmental Protection Agency. It is people 
who are given a standard they need to meet and can come 
up with all kinds of different ways to meet that standard.”99
 Speaking from the perspective of an environmental advocate, 
economist Charles Levenstein provides a critique of Norton’s framing 
of environmental issues: 
A dominant notion in the world today is that the way to hu-
man progress is the private market and that virtually any-
thing interfering with market forces results in declines in 
human welfare. Government is viewed as inherently 
inefªcient, bureaucratic, and undesirable—an intrusion on 
the liberties of free people. In only the most limited circum-
stances may government intervene in the marketplace. Poli-
tics are viewed as corrupt and degraded by special interests, 
while the market is seen to reºect the true desires of rational 
individuals. The less government, the better; the less interfer-
ence, the better. 
                                                                                                                      
97 See Redal, supra note 4. 
98 Id. (quoting Gale Norton, U.S. Sec’y of Interior, Address at University of Colorado at 
Boulder (Nov. 23, 2004)). 
99 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Gale Norton, Sec’y of Interior, Address 
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 . . . For a democracy, this is a strange and debilitating 
rhetoric.100
 Environmental advocates, such as Levenstein—the editor of New 
Solutions: A Journal of Environmental and Occupational Health Policy 101— 
list as the outcome of such debilitating rhetoric the increasingly 
common assumption of U.S. citizens that freedom means individual 
freedom from taxes, which frees market forces from governmental 
regulation. As cultural resonances to support the argument, some 
draw on the tax rebellions that accompanied the American Revolu-
tion.102 In each environmental policy debate, conservatives work to ªt 
the given issue into this “freedom as market competition” paradigm, 
which is the libertarian metaframe. 
 The appeal of framing lies in its ability to suppress the opposition’s 
best arguments. For example, the libertarian perspective does not have 
to argue against community investment, risk prevention, and longterm 
conservation. In discrediting and derailing government as the institu-
tion that thinks longterm, protects the most vulnerable, and dares chal-
lenge the most powerful when they act contrary to community inter-
ests, the libertarian metaframe simply moves these issues to the 
background. The environment is another spreadsheet item that will 
respond to the “creative” forces of the market. If there were a market 
for environmentalism, it would happen. 
 As in the case of social welfare policy, environmental advocates 
can anticipate ªnding themselves facing libertarian-based initiatives 
on the many fronts inherent to environmental policy: 
• Energy issues and biodiversity may pit individual freedom—for 
both persons and corporations—against governmental regulation; 
• Shortterm proªts against longterm environmental planning; 
• Risk assessment grounded in cost-beneªt analysis against risk-
prevention strategies based on social health measures. 
                                                                                                                      
100 Charles Levenstein, Sociopolitical and Economic Aspects of Risk Assessment, in Chemical 
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 To survive and succeed, environmental policy advocates must suc-
ceed where social welfare advocates fell short. They must establish a 
deeper base of support and transcend the speciªcs of individual policy 
battles. Reºecting on past campaigns—and in dialogue with the full 
panoply of local, regional, and national organizations that comprise an 
impressive, if fragmented, chorus of pro-environmental voices— envi-
ronmental policy makers need to reestablish a commitment to positive 
liberty.103
 This course of action will allow environmental policy analysts to 
establish proactive themes. Environmental advocates should not re-
spond to libertarian claims that “government is incompetent, if not 
corrupt,” with a mechanical counterclaim of “government is not cor-
rupt.” Instead, a proactive metaframe would allow environmental ad-
vocates to reframe issues in terms of balancing individual freedom 
from interference with positive freedom to build community, invest in 
the nation’s global commons, and function as collective citizens who 
participate in political processes as intentional actors concerned with 
the community’s longterm interests. 
 Standard bearers emerge from such political activism. The ability 
to make claims grows as social networks become more dense, and 
switchpoint cases present themselves when collective citizens are ready 
to use them.104 Hurricane Katrina provides a case in point. In an at-
tempt to counter the libertarian metaframe as applied to the environ-
ment, environmental advocates are posing Hurricane Katrina as the 
switchpoint case that illustrates America’s failure to address environ-
mental concerns, such as wetland protection. Some advocates further 
argue that the post-Katrina humanitarian disasters represent the failure 
of the Republicans to invest in social infrastructure.105 The positive role 
of government can now be seen in its absence. No one in government, 
the argument goes, is thinking about longterm environmental plan-
ning, no one is planning for disaster relief, and even after the disaster, 
no one is interested in protecting the most vulnerable communities. 
                                                                                                                      
103 See Hirschman, supra note 5, at 87. 
104 It is important to remember that switchpoint cases are human fabrications. They 
are shaped by active social agents who engage in a whole set of activities to sponsor an 
event as a switchpoint. Whether or not they succeed depends on the ªt of the particular 
case to the particular situation and on the readiness of the social agent to sponsor the case. 
See supra Part I.B.1. 
105 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, The Price of Ideology and Cronyism: Katrina’s Victims Have Paid 
for the Right’s Hostility to the Public Sector, Guardian (Manchester, U.K.), Sept. 6, 2005, at 22. 
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 Environmentalists conclude that the debacles surrounding Ka-
trina demonstrate what happens when societies move environmental 
policy decisions out of government hands and into private initiatives, 
be they market-driven alternatives to environmental regulation or 
volunteer substitutes for environmental planning and disaster re-
lief.106 Environmentalists are attempting to use Katrina as a switch-
point case to argue the limits of market-driven environmental plan-
ning: 
[L]et us reºect on an important fact: different populations 
are not affected equally by environmental disaster. The effects 
of severe weather events disproportionately affect the poor 
and powerless, who have fewer resources to respond to calam-
ity. In New Orleans, helicopters airlifted victims from the roofs 
of private hospitals while charity hospitals pleaded desperately 
for help. Those in well-appointed neighbourhoods escaped in 
their own cars; the poor, predominantly black, citizens from 
low-lying areas were typically not so lucky. 
 If the unequal distribution of safety along social and racial 
lines in New Orleans has shocked us, we should not forget 
that in many corners of the world marginalized populations 
suffer disproportionately both from environmental disaster 
and from gradual climate change. In part, this is because the 
fruits of science and technology are not distributed equally. In 
the failure to maintain the levees despite the disaster-
modelling of engineers, in the failure to install a tidal wave 
warning system in earthquake-prone regions (except those ad-
jacent to our developed world), in the failure to advance a 
truly global pandemic-preparedness plan against avian 
inºuenza, similar mechanisms of selªshness and short-
sightedness are at work.107
 From this position, environmentalists can ask a number of ques-
tions that serve to reframe their issue. How should citizens in a de-
mocracy assign power over longterm planning regarding conservation 
and preservation? Who should decide how much environmental risk 
should be assumed, and who should assume that risk? Who will pre-
pare to prevent disasters and to respond to them when they cannot be 
                                                                                                                      
106 Editorial, Katrina, Climate Change and the Poor, 173 Canadian Med. Ass’n J. 837, 837 
(2005), available at http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/content/full/173/8/837. 
107 Id. 
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prevented? Furthermore, who will protect a free press and free sci-
entiªc inquiry from coercion so that those who might alert citizens to 
environmental dangers are not silenced by those with shortterm and 
contrary interests? 
 Framing contests are just that, contests. There are always other 
players contesting to control the ªeld in order to gain the public’s 
attention. If environmental advocates fail to establish a shared meta-
frame and solidify its application in many concrete policy initiatives, 
they yield ground to their opponents. Again, the example of Katrina 
is instructive. To the environmental advocate, Katrina appears as a no-
brainer. It is the perfect clarion call for environmental conservation, 
reduction in emissions, and disaster planning. However, conservatives 
have also been swift in applying the libertarian metaframe. The result 
is a conservative issue frame that is striking in its resemblance to the 
personal responsibility frame of the 1990s. For example, a vice presi-
dent of the Heritage Foundation has gone so far as to cite the Katrina 
disaster as proof that New Deal-era government programs “‘were fail-
ing anyway.’”108
 It is important to note that this frame—which clearly points to 
the ineffectiveness of underfunded governmental programs as evi-
dence that the programs should never have been instituted—has had 
concrete policy implications in the aftermath of Katrina. The Bush 
administration’s solutions have focused on “freeing the market” 
through such deregulatory action as releasing federally-funded con-
tractors from the requirement that they meet average wage require-
ments.109 The administration has also vowed to recuperate funds that 
have been allocated in response to this crisis through massive spend-
ing cuts, “with programs like Medicaid and food stamps especially 
vulnerable.”110 The conservative tactics deployed here should be fa-
miliar given the above discussion of the 1990s battle over welfare cuts: 
the common sense torpedo of “there’s no money”—working in con-
junction with the libertarian assumption that government can only 
worsen the situation—clears the way for a scalpel attack that begins by 
targeting the most vulnerable citizens.111
                                                                                                                      
108 See Jason DeParle, Liberal Hopes Ebb in Post-Storm Poverty Debate: An Ideological Clash 
over How to Help America’s Poor, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 2005, at A1 (quoting Stuart M. Butler, 
Vice President Heritage Found.). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 See supra Parts II, III. 
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 The response of commentator Bill O’Reilly, as reported by radio 
host Ira Glass, typiªes one frame sponsored by conservatives immedi-
ately following Katrina: “First, he said, you can’t rely on government. 
And second, he said, the problems that we saw in New Orleans weren’t 
about race, they were about class.”112 Glass replayed the following rep-
resentative quote from O’Reilly—its ferocity predictably veiled in 
“common sense” rhetoric: 
 If you’re poor, you’re powerless. Not only in America, but 
everywhere on earth. If you don’t have enough money to pro-
tect yourself from danger, danger’s gonna ªnd you. The af-
termath of Hurricane Katrina should be taught in every 
American school, if you don’t get educated, if you don’t de-
velop a skill and force yourself to work hard, you’ll most likely 
be poor, and sooner or later you’ll be standing on a symbolic 
rooftop waiting for help. Chances are, that help will not be 
quick in coming.113
In response to O’Reilly’s framing, Glass included the response of 
eighteen-year-old New Orleans resident Ashley Nelson, who was read 
the O’Reilly quote by Glass’s producer, Alex Blumberg: 
ASHLEY NELSON: That’s what he [O’Reilly] said? 
ALEX BLUMBERG: Yeah. 
ASHLEY NELSON: He said that[?] 
ALEX BLUMBERG: On TV. Yeah. To you, what’s the thing 
that stands out the most about that? 
ASHLEY NELSON: Basically saying if you’re rich, you live, if 
you’re poor, you die. And I didn’t have no idea that it was a 
crime to be poor, and the punishment was death.114
 Nelson’s quotation, which amounts to no less than a powerful re-
framing of Katrina, invokes the terrifying vision of a planet of individu-
als uncommitted to community investment, longterm planning, and 
protection of the vulnerable. In its effectiveness, it also highlights the 
need for advocates to create real dialogue with those directly affected 
by environmental crises to incorporate the experiences of those most 
affected into existing sophisticated frames, and to promote those 
frames through collaborative movement-building. 
                                                                                                                      
112 This American Life: After the Flood (WBEZ Chicago radio broadcast Sept. 9–11, 2005), 
available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/pdf/296.pdf. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
592 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 33:563 
Conclusion: Ten Practical Steps for Environmental  
Legal Advocates 
• All effective media strategies should build on sustainable organiz-
ing strategies that target one or more arenas—whether legisla-
tion, regulation, electorate, or media. 
• Treat the media arena as worthy of time, research, and resources 
in its own right. 
• Take the long view. Learn from conservatives who positioned 
themselves through small skirmishes and often lost. Place indi-
vidual maneuvers within a broader war of position. 
• Prepare for the long haul by establishing a communications in-
frastructure. 
• Build leadership capacity by institutionalizing a media caucus. 
Everyone in your organization must be a communicator. Every-
one must learn how to apply a generic shared view of the envi-
ronment to the given issue or crisis of the day. 
• Apply to the media arena the skills used in preparing cases and 
making arguments to a jury. 
• Think about audiences and, in fact, multiple audiences. A key 
decisionmaker is an audience of one. 
• Read and watch what your audiences read and watch. Know what 
they’ve heard. 
• Do not take your allies for granted. Communicate and build coa-
litions. 
• Frame messages about the environment to convey a broader mes-
sage about the importance of citizen-driven government. Restore 
the notion of taxes as investment in community. 
